Executive Branch Turnover and Non-Resource Economic Growth in Kazakhstan: An Event-Study Analysis
https://doi.org/10.47703/2789-8253-2026-3-128-146
Abstract
The development of the non-resource sector largely depends not only on the foreign economic environment but also on the stability of public administration institutions and the continuity of economic policy. This study examines the dynamics of non-resource economic performance around major changes in government leadership in Kazakhstan using an event-study framework. The empirical base covers 1995-2019 and includes annual data from the Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the International Monetary Fund, information on prime minister and minister appointments, and oil price indicators. The study uses descriptive analysis, basic OLS regression, an event-study specification, and robustness checks; standard errors are calculated using the Newey–West HAC method. In the baseline model, the MajorResh coefficient was negative but statistically insignificant for both non-resource GDP (β = −2.95; p = 0.192) and the manufacturing industry (β = −1.37; p = 0.265). At the same time, the event-study analysis revealed a statistically significant decline in the nominal growth of non-resource GDP in the year of the prime minister’s change (β = −4.94; p = 0.016) and a negative relationship in the following year (β = −4.65; p = 0.074). Additional analysis showed a statistically significant negative relationship between changes in the minister of industry and manufacturing output (β = −4.40; p = 0.008), while changes in the minister of finance showed no statistically significant results. The results indicate that the rotation of executive power is primarily associated with a short-term deterioration in the performance of the non-resource economy.
About the Authors
B. Kalen
Economic research Institute
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan
Kalen Bauyrzhan - Master
Astana
I. Tenyakov
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Ivan Tenyakov – Cand. Sc. (Econ.)
Moscow
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For citations:
Kalen B., Tenyakov I. Executive Branch Turnover and Non-Resource Economic Growth in Kazakhstan: An Event-Study Analysis. Eurasian Journal of Economic and Business Studies. 2026;70(3):128-146. https://doi.org/10.47703/2789-8253-2026-3-128-146
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