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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="en"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">ejebs</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="en">Eurasian Journal of Economic and Business Studies</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title>Название журнала на русском</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2789-8253</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2789-8261</issn><publisher><publisher-name>University of International Business named after K. Sagadiyev</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.47703/2789-8253-2026-3-128-146</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">ejebs-313</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>Статьи</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Executive Branch Turnover and Non-Resource Economic Growth in Kazakhstan: An Event-Study Analysis</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="ru"><trans-title></trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kalen</surname><given-names>B.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Kalen Bauyrzhan - Master</p><p>Astana</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">b.kalen@eri.kz</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Tenyakov</surname><given-names>I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Ivan Tenyakov – Cand. Sc. (Econ.)</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">itenyakov@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-2"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff xml:lang="en" id="aff-1"><institution>Economic research Institute</institution><country>Kazakhstan</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en" id="aff-2"><institution>Lomonosov Moscow State University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>04</day><month>10</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>70</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>128</fpage><lpage>146</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Kalen B., Tenyakov I., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Kalen B., Tenyakov I.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kalen B., Tenyakov I.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://ejebs.uib.kz/jour/article/view/313">https://ejebs.uib.kz/jour/article/view/313</self-uri><abstract><p>The development of the non-resource sector largely depends not only on the foreign economic environment but also on the stability of public administration institutions and the continuity of economic policy. This study examines the dynamics of non-resource economic performance around major changes in government leadership in Kazakhstan using an event-study framework. The empirical base covers 1995-2019 and includes annual data from the Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the International Monetary Fund, information on prime minister and minister appointments, and oil price indicators. The study uses descriptive analysis, basic OLS regression, an event-study specification, and robustness checks; standard errors are calculated using the Newey–West HAC method. In the baseline model, the MajorResh coefficient was negative but statistically insignificant for both non-resource GDP (β = −2.95; p = 0.192) and the manufacturing industry (β = −1.37; p = 0.265). At the same time, the event-study analysis revealed a statistically significant decline in the nominal growth of non-resource GDP in the year of the prime minister’s change (β = −4.94; p = 0.016) and a negative relationship in the following year (β = −4.65; p = 0.074). Additional analysis showed a statistically significant negative relationship between changes in the minister of industry and manufacturing output (β = −4.40; p = 0.008), while changes in the minister of finance showed no statistically significant results. The results indicate that the rotation of executive power is primarily associated with a short-term deterioration in the performance of the non-resource economy.</p></abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>Economic Growth</kwd><kwd>Non Resource Economy</kwd><kwd>Economic Policy</kwd><kwd>Institutional Stability</kwd><kwd>Public Administration</kwd><kwd>Industry</kwd><kwd>Industrial Policy</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Aisen, A., &amp; Veiga, F. J. (2013). How does political instability affect economic growth? European Journal of Political Economy, 29, 151-167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.11.001</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Aisen, A., &amp; Veiga, F. J. (2013). How does political instability affect economic growth? 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